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This paper studies the relationship between the agency problem, financial performance and corruption from
country, industry and firm level perspectives. First, we observe that companies operating in countries with a high
level of corruption tend to display relatively low returns. Second, in an industry-by-industry context, we find that
the negative relationship between corruption and average stock returns is stronger in specific industries, which
we define as ‘corruption sensitive’. Third, at the firm level, we show that agency problems are exacerbated in
corruption-sensitive industries. Our study builds on the existing literature in three main areas. First, it proposes
a novel macro-based approach aimed at identifying corruption-sensitive industries. Second, it provides evidence
supporting that corruption exacerbates agency conflicts. Third, it provides evidence on the generalizability of
standard corporate governance predictions to companies operating in corruption-sensitive industries.
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Introduction
Corruption has received an enormous amount of atten-
tion in recent literature, much of it devoted to examining
its effects on macroeconomic aggregates (e.g., output,
consumption, technology stock, investments, and physi-
cal capital). Relatively little research, however, has
examined the impact of corruption on financial perfor-
mance at the country, industry and firm level. In an
influential paper, Mauro (1995) observes that corruption
can have a sizable adverse effect on economic activity.
In particular, it may lower the average growth rate of
both the country and the firm. More recent studies exam-
ining the effects of corruption on the economic develop-
ment and firm performance support this early finding
(Doh et al., 2003; Rodriguez et al., 2006; Uhlenbruck
et al., 2006).
At the country level of analysis, this study examines
whether companies operating in countries with a rela-
tively high level of corruption display weaker financial
performances. This issue is of general interest and has
not been fully addressed by previous studies (see
Smarzynska-Javorcik and Wei, 2000; Weitzel and Berns,
2006). Unlike existing studies, which focus exclusively
on the whole stock market (i.e., country stock indexes),
we examine the corruption-performance relationship in
an industry-by-industry context. Specifically, we iden-
tify industries where the relationship between corruption
and financial performance is stronger and define these
industries as ‘corruption-sensitive industries’. Policy
makers may find our results of interest, as they may want
to implement stricter regulations in such industries. This,
in turn, could make investors more cautious about
investing in specific industries. This novel industry-
based approach allows us to show that companies oper-
ating in corruption-sensitive contexts may present
relevant corporate governance differences, if compared
to others, thus motivating our classification and calling
for more research into their corporate governance.
At the firm level, we test whether corruption exacer-
bates the agency conflicts between managers and
owners. The agency problem, identified in 1976
by Jensen and Meckling, relies on the separation
between ownership and control in companies characte-
rized by dispersed ownership (see Berle and Means,
1932), or between majority shareholders and minority
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shareholders in companies with a blockholder posses-
sing the majority vote and decision power (see Shleifer
and Vishny, 1986; La Porta et al., 1999). Managers that
are in charge of controlling daily business may exploit
the resources of the firm in order to pay public officials
to get personal benefits. In doing so, they can establish a
direct relationship with the corrupt public officials. Of
course, they may also corrupt public officials in order to
obtain short-term advantages for the company. However,
this might jeopardize the ability of the company to create
value in the long-run. In both cases, the company experi-
ences an agency problem. Our results suggest that com-
panies operating in corruption-sensitive industries do
have higher agency costs. We stress that this is in line
with recent works aimed at examining agency problems
due to corruption.
Given the presence of relatively high agency costs in
corruption-sensitive industries, our work examines the
effects of corporate governance mechanisms (i.e., board
size, board meetings and the percentage of independent
directors on the board) on financial performance in
corruption-sensitive industries and non-corruption-
sensitive industries. We stress that such mechanisms are
expected to serve different purposes when the corruption
variable is included in the analysis, thus questioning the
predictions of standard corporate governance literature.
In particular, we show that, while the number of board
meetings has the same impact on performance in
corruption-sensitive and non-corruption-sensitive indus-
tries, board size and the percentage of independent
directors do not.
Our paper builds on the existing literature in several
areas. First, it sheds light on the effects of corruption on
firms’ average financial performance in different indus-
tries. Second, it proposes an alternative macro-based
criterion to classify industries as corruption-sensitive
and non-corruption-sensitive. Third, it shows that
agency costs, and consequently corporate governance
mechanisms, change depending on the level of
corruption-sensitivity. Overall, this study suggests that
corruption ought to be seen in an industry-by-industry
context and not only at the country level, especially
given the increasing globalization of culture and national
markets. We conclude by arguing that our results
have strong academic, policy-making and investment
implications.
Background
Following previous studies (Rose-Ackerman, 1975,
1978; Bardhan, 1997; Treisman, 2000; Svensson, 2005),
we refer to corruption as the ‘misuse of public office for
private gain’. In other words, we focus on ‘public cor-
ruption’, consistently with existing works (Rodriguez
et al. 2006; Uhlenbruck et al. 2006). We divide this
section into three parts in order to provide a literature
review for each of the main issues investigated in this
paper. In the first subsection, we review the literature
examining the relationship between corruption and
firms’ financial performance in a country-by-country
context; in the second subsection, we analyse previous
studies focusing on corruption at the firm level; finally,
in the third subsection, we review the literature about
corruption and corporate governance.
Corruption within a country and firms’
market performance
Corruption has been seen as a major threat for countries’
economic performance during the last two decades. It
has been argued that low average levels of physical
capital, human capital (i.e., education) and technology
are not solely responsible for the observed mild eco-
nomic growth rates in some world regions (Cazzavillan
et al., 2013). Other factors may play a crucial role, such
as corruption, political stability and crime (see Caselli,
2005).
A growing academic and policy consensus is that cor-
ruption is often high in low-income countries, and is
costly. However, data (see Table 3) suggest that there is
a non-negligible degree of heterogeneity in the level of
corruption (or in the perception of corruption) among
medium and high-income countries as well (see also
Prosperi, 2013; Donadelli and Persha, 2014). The real
economic consequences of corruption are well known.
For example, there are several empirical studies (see
Mauro, 1995; Wei, 2000; Gupta et al., 2001) showing
that corruption affects a wide range of social and eco-
nomic phenomena (e.g., economic growth, FDI, coun-
tries’ healthcare systems, and education). While it is well
established that a lower GDP growth rate corresponds to
a relatively high level of corruption, little is known about
the effects of the corruption of a country on firm perfor-
mance as well as on publicly traded firms’ share values.
The theory here is that corruption may have a strong
effect on financial markets. This is consistent with exist-
ing studies showing that higher corruption within a
country is associated with higher borrowing cost, worse
corporate governance and lower stock valuation. In a
very influential article, Diamonte et al. (1996) observe
that average equity market returns in countries experi-
encing increased corruption levels (i.e., increased politi-
cal risk) are significantly higher than in countries
experiencing decreased corruption levels. In a theoreti-
cal setup, Garmaise and Liu (2005) show that in pres-
ence of corruption – measured by the percentage of
dishonest managers – a firm’s values as well as its profits
are reduced. It turns out that the realized equity returns,
in the presence of corruption, may be lower both at the
country and firm level. Lee and Ng (2006) find that
the level of corruption within a country – measured
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by Transparency International’s Corruption Perception
Index – negatively affects expected future cash flows and
can have sizable adverse effects on shareholder value. In
other words, it may lower average realized returns. Note
also that corruption tends to increase a firm’s exposure
to systemic risk (i.e., a firm’s betas). As a result, a highly
corrupted country may exhibit a higher expected equity
risk premium.
Corruption and firm performance
Research on corruption has developed rapidly over the
last decades, focusing mainly on managerial reactions to
corruption. Smarzynska-Javorcik and Wei (2000) found
that higher levels of corruption actually increase the
likelihood of entry into the market via joint venture.
Shleifer and Vishny (1993) observe that if public offi-
cials do not coordinate their extraction of bribes, they
fail to internalize the effect of their demands for bribes
on other officials’ incomes, leading to a very high level
of corruption. Shleifer and Vishny (1994) point out that
control rights actually determine the threat point in
negotiations between the firm and public official. Bliss
and Di Tella (1997) study the relationship between cor-
ruption and competition and show that if bureaucrats
have power to extract money from firms, they will drive
the most inefficient firms out of the market, increasing
the profitability of other firms running similar busi-
nesses, which, in turn, makes it possible to ask for higher
bribes. Svensson (2003) describes the figures that must
pay bribes and tries to quantify these bribes. He discov-
ers that firms tend to pay bribes when dealing with
public officials whose actions directly affect the firm’s
business operations.
Another strand of literature focuses on the impact of
corruption on foreign direct investment – FDI (Wei,
2000; Smarzynska-Javorcik and Wei, 2005). Among the
most recent studies, Habib and Zurawicki (2002) found
that FDI are reduced by corruption even when control-
ling for political risk and level-of-corruption differences
between the home and host countries. Cole et al. (2009),
in the Chinese context, observe that investments tend to
flow into provinces displaying two main characteristics:
(1) a relatively high level of government efficiency; and
(2) a strong attitude in fighting against corruption.
Only in more recent years have scholars started to
analyse the relationship between corruption levels and
firms’ financial performance. However, most of them
focus on one single economy. Athanasouli et al. (2012)
investigate the relationship between corruption and
firm performance in Greece using firm-level data.
Focusing on the effect of ‘administrative corruption’,
whereby firms engage in corrupt practices and bribery
of government officials, they show that corruption is
negatively associated with firm size and growth. Teal
and McArthur (2002) use survey data to investigate the
importance of corruption in determining firm perfor-
mance in Africa. They find that corruption is linked
to significant adverse effects on firm performance in
two ways: at the firm level, companies that pay bribes
have 20 per cent lower levels of output per worker;
at the macro level, firms in countries with pervasive
corruption are some 70% less efficient than firms
in corruption-free countries. Similarly, in the African
context, Faruq and Webb (2013) find that less pro-
ductive firms are more likely to engage in corrupt
activities. In addition, they observe that both poor
bureaucratic quality and corruption reduce firm prod-
uctivity. Sahakyan and Stiegert (2012) examine the
effects of corruption among Armenian firms. They test
if corruption is perceived as more favourable among
firms that do not face significant competition and are
relatively large and young. Gaviria (2002) employs a
survey of Latin American private firms to assess the
effects of corruption on sales, investment and employ-
ment growth at the firm level, and whether bribes and
illegal payments by firms reduce bureaucratic inter-
ference. The author’s empirical findings suggest the
following: (1) corruption substantially reduces sales
growth; and (2) corruption and bureaucratic interfer-
ence are positively correlated, (i.e., corruption reduces
firm competitiveness).
We extend this stream of research further by examin-
ing the impact of corruption on firm performance, as
measured by stock returns. We focus first on the costs of
corruption, which may reduce the performance of the
firm. Some research suggests that most severe effects
of corruption are due to the uncertainty surrounding
corrupt transactions, rather than from their monetary
costs (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). Based on this
premise, Doh et al. (2003) point out that corruption can
be studied in two parts: (1) the uncertainty of the corrupt
transactions, arbitrariness; and (2) the frequency of the
corrupt transactions, pervasiveness. Both parts generate
two types of costs: direct and indirect costs. Direct costs
are represented by bribes, kickbacks, ‘grease’, and result
from the direct interaction between the firm and the
public officials. These costs can come from both the
payment of amounts to the public officials to obtain what
the firm needs (e.g., a permit, protection, etc.), as well as
from the avoidance of paying corrupt officials. The indi-
rect costs could mean higher prices for resources, lower
profitability for lost jobs, macroeconomic instability and
so on. These costs impact the firm indirectly, mostly via
failures of public entities and governments.
Corruption, corporate governance and
firm performance
Besides the costs that a firm may be forced to pay in a
corrupted environment, other drivers affecting the per-
formance of the firm, also potentially distorted by
Agency Problem, Financial Performance and Corruption 261
© 2014 European Academy of Management
corruption, should be examined. The most relevant is the
firm’s corporate governance. Several studies observe
that a good level of governance is positively correlated
with good firm performance (Yermack, 1996; Klein,
1998; Gompers et al., 2003; Brown and Caylor, 2006;
Chen et al., 2006). A crucial issue is whether corporate
governance can enhance the performance of the firm
regardless of the level of corruption. In other words, it
has been asked whether corporate governance is directly
influenced by corruption, losing its positive effect on
firm performance. Previous studies have shown how low
corporate governance standards raise the cost of capital,
lower the operating performance of industries, and
impede investment inflows (Agrawal and Knoeber,
1996; Himmelberg et al., 2001; Daily et al., 2003). Due
to corporate governance scandals, it has emerged as a
major mechanism to better protect the interests of dif-
ferent stakeholders (Magnanelli and Pirolo, 2014). As a
result, policymakers worldwide have devoted increasing
attention to the role of governance against corruption.
Academics, in fact, provide evidence that poor corpo-
rate governance breeds corruption. Not surprisingly,
rules of corporate governance, such as accountability,
transparency, and fairness, influence the motives and
constraints of both bribe takers and bribe payers
involved in corrupt practices. Wu (2005) focuses on the
principal–agent problem in modern corporate systems.
He states that many firms still get involved in corrupt
practices despite the possibility that the cost of bribery
may outweigh the benefit. The agency problem exists
when there is a separation between the owners, princi-
pals, and the managers, agents, because their interests
do not go in the same direction (Jensen and Meckling,
1976; Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983). The
primary interest of the owners is to maximize the return
from their investments, while the main interest for man-
agers is to: (1) maximize their profit; (2) maintain their
position; and (3) gain personal benefits (Johnson et al.,
2009; Robinson and Sartore, 2011). As Wu (2005) points
out, ‘bribery may offer the managers the opportunity to
cash in on any immediate upside movement from
bribery activity while leaving the future potential risk
and cost to the owners or shareholders’ (p. 155). The
possibility of getting business through bribery may
allow a manager to temporarily hide his failure to
enhance the value of the company, and bribery could
permit the manager to evade his duty without facing the
consequence of such conduct. Thus, according to exist-
ing literature, corporate governance seems to reduce the
likelihood of managers committing corrupt actions.
Hypothesis Development
This section is divided into three different parts, consist-
ent with our literature background and paper’s main
goals. The first subsection focuses on the effect of cor-
ruption within a country on firm market performance
(Hypothesis 1). The second subsection is about corrup-
tion and agency conflicts arising within firms (Hypoth-
esis 2). The third subsection relies on how corporate
governance influences firm performance in corruption-
sensitive industries (Hypotheses 3, 4, 5).
Corruption and financial performance of firms at
country level
Over the last 20 years, global markets have become
increasingly integrated. This has improved both cross-
country and cross-industry risk-sharing opportunities. In
economic terms, investors have more possibilities to be
insured against bad states of nature, both domestically
and internationally. However, cross-country differences
in the amount of ‘frictions’ may induce economic agents
to behave differently. For example, a higher level of
corruption (or a higher perception of corruption) intro-
duces market frictions, which forces investors to move
capital from ‘high-corrupted countries/industries’ to
‘low-corrupted countries/industries’. In doing so, they
improve consumption smoothing (i.e., they increase
insurance benefits against bad economic times). There-
fore, countries experiencing a relatively low level of
corruption tend to exhibit higher capital inflow amounts.
Consequently, investment and output increases, that is,
equity firm performance increases. In such a scenario,
we should observe higher average equity returns. Thus,
aligned with previous research (Jain 2001; Donadelli
and Persha 2014), we hypothesize that investors tend to
re-balance their portfolio by taking long positions in less
corrupted environments. Formally,
Hypothesis 1: The higher the country level corrup-
tion, the lower a firm’s average return.
Corruption, industries and firm performance
The second part of this paper examines the effects of
corruption in a firm-by-firm context. In order to frame
(and test) our hypotheses, we follow the following
scheme: first, firms are classified into ten different indus-
tries. Based on the strength of the relationship between
average corruption and average return, industries are
then divided into two categories: ‘corruption-sensitive
industries’ and ‘non-corruption-sensitive industries’.
In order to set the hypothesis, we rely on the agency
theory framework (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Man-
agers are the figures that actually manage and run the
firm. They make decisions, they evaluate alternatives
and they look for business opportunities. With more
power and information than the owners, they can exploit
their position in order to gain personal benefits (Johnson
et al., 2009; Robinson and Sartore, 2011). Thus, again
262 M. Donadelli et al.
© 2014 European Academy of Management
due to their role and position, they are the most exposed
to the possibility of offering bribes to public officials
(i.e., to engage in corruption). In order to maintain (or
gain) privileges and bonuses, managers may accept
opportunities arising from corrupt activities, because it
could be useful for their goals in the short term. Anec-
dotal evidence suggests that companies can obtain busi-
ness opportunities through bribes (especially in cases
where the buyer is the government). For example, in
2012, Pfizer violated the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(FCPA) when its subsidiaries bribed doctors and other
healthcare professionals employed by foreign govern-
ments in order to win business; in 2014, Hewlett-
Packard was charged by The Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) for having violated the FCPA
when its subsidiaries in three different countries made
improper payments to government officials to obtain or
retain lucrative contracts. In 2014, Alcoa Inc. and Alcoa
World Aluminium’s subsidiaries repeatedly paid bribes
to government officials in Bahrain to maintain a key
source of business. In the short term, this behaviour may
increase company performance, but it could also expose
the company to the risk of being sued (and potentially
convicted) for bribery. In other words, in the long term
the company may be losing future business opportunities
with entities (such as state-owned entities) requiring
certain minimum ethical standards of their suppliers.
Apart from this situation, where managers have a short-
term performance view, managers could also exploit the
resources of the firm to pay public officials to get per-
sonal benefits and to establish a relationship with those
corrupt officials.
In both scenarios (corruption to the benefit of the
company and to the personal benefit of the manager),
corruption imposes agency costs to the firm. Therefore,
companies operating in industries where the relationship
between corruption and financial performance is higher
may face higher agency costs. In other words, in partici-
pating in corruption, managers act following their own
interests and not pursuing those of the shareholders,
generating a misalignment of interests that imposes
costs to the company. This leads to the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Corruption exacerbates agency con-
flicts between managers and owners.
Corruption, corporate governance and
firm performance
The third objective of this study is to test the effect of
three corporate governance characteristics (i.e., board
size, board meetings and percentage of independent
directors) on average firm stock returns.
Corporate governance and its mechanisms should
reduce the misalignment of interests between owners
and managers, leading managers to act in order to max-
imize profit for shareholders and enhance the value of
the firm (Dey, 2008). One of the most important corpo-
rate governance mechanisms of a firm is the Board of
Directors (BoD), due to its direct control over managers.
In this setting, the effectiveness of the BoD seems to be
central in reducing the likelihood of corrupt activity by
managers. Good governance would reduce the likeli-
hood of managers implementing activities that are to the
detriment of shareholders (such as corrupt activity).
Previous literature has shown that a good level of
governance is positively associated with better financial
performance. Our main research question deals with the
ability of corporate governance to actually enhance the
performance of a firm in settings where corruption has a
high impact on financial performance (i.e., corruption-
sensitive industries). Therefore, we test the relationship
between three board characteristics (i.e., size, percent-
age of independent directors and number of board
meetings) – usually assumed as indicators of good per-
formance – and the market performance of firms in
corruption-sensitive industries. The choice of using
these indicators is motivated by two main factors. First,
they are among those most often studied in previous
works (for board size, see Alexander et al., 1993;
Yermack, 1996; for percentage of independent directors,
see Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; Harris and Raviv,
2008; for board meetings see Lipton and Lorsch 1992).
Second, since our work could be useful for companies
and investors, these indicators are both more easily man-
ageable to companies and more easily cognizable to
external investors.
We stress that the issue is relevant because it allows
the contextualization of predictions of ‘standard’ corpo-
rate governance literature in settings where the influence
of corruption is stronger and where the tasks that the
corporate governance system needs to perform are dif-
ferent. We look at industries where the relationship
between corruption and performance is stronger, and
analyse whether board size, board meetings and inde-
pendent directors have different effects on performance,
compared to what the existing literature predicts.
The relationship between board size and board effec-
tiveness has received much attention in the academic
field. On the one hand, studies supporting a positive
relationship between board size and the effectiveness of
monitoring (and therefore financial performance) rely
on the resource dependence theory (see Salancik and
Pfeffer, 1978; Alexander et al., 1993). These studies
argue that large boards provide valuable resources to the
organization, leading to better operations. This theoreti-
cal argument is tested (and confirmed) by several
empirical analyses (see Mak and Li, 2001; Di Pietra
et al., 2008).
Despite this vast literature, several other studies argue
that small boards are more effective than large boards
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because larger boards will experience greater difficulty
in reaching an agreement and in exercising their power
with the CEO. According to Steiner (1966), larger
boards lose actual productivity because of losses in
motivation and coordination. Lipton and Lorsch (1992)
argue that the lack of time and the size of the board may
lead to lack of cohesiveness and to boards not being able
to work towards a common objective. Various empirical
analyses support the negative association between board
size and CFP (Yermack, 1996; Eisenberg et al., 1998).
This study is aimed at understanding the effect
of board size on a firm’s average performance in
corruption-sensitive industries. We argue that, in the
context of industries where the relationship between cor-
ruption level and financial performance is stronger, a
larger board size means a higher probability for directors
to be in contact with public officials offering the pos-
sibility to corrupt. It is reasonable to expect that corrup-
tion will arise from direct knowledge between managers
and public officials. In particular, the board of directors
has an important role in shaping the strategy of the
company and has a deep knowledge of the company.
Therefore, it may be that the higher the number of board
members, the higher the potential for corruption. As
mentioned in the previous section, higher levels of
corruption will cause a decrease in the performance
of the company, therefore we can hypothesize that, in
corruption-sensitive industries, the larger the size of the
board, the higher the corruption activity, and the lower
the financial performance, compared to non-corruption-
sensitive industries. Therefore, we propose the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: The negative association between
board size and returns is stronger in corruption-
sensitive industries.
Previous literature on the efficiency of the board pre-
dicts that the higher the number of board meetings, the
better the governance of the firm (Lipton and Lorsch,
1992), considering that more meetings would imply
deeper control and better knowledge of the company’s
situation.
In the particular context of high-corruption industries,
we question whether this relationship is still valid or not.
We argue that increasing the number of board meetings
could actually raise the possibility of exchanging infor-
mation and contacts, and of implementing potential
corrupt activities. As we do not make any predictions on
causality, it may also be that managers pressure boards
to meet more often in order to increase the possibility of
sharing useful information to engage in corrupt activ-
ities. This leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4: The association between board meet-
ings and returns is negative in corruption-sensitive
industries.
The issue of the effectiveness of outside directors as
monitors has been widely debated in literature. Fama
(1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983) provide the tradi-
tional argument that outside directors will be more effec-
tive monitors because of their strong incentive to
develop a reputation as decision control experts in the
labour market. Conversely, other authors cast doubt on
the effectiveness of outside directors as efficient moni-
tors (see Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; Jensen, 1993;
Harris and Raviv, 2008). In the empirical literature, there
seems to be a consensus on the beneficial role of outside
directors on CEO turnover sensitivity to financial
performance (Weisbach, 1988; Rosenstein and Wyatt,
1990; Goyal and Park, 2002).
The independent directors would ensure external
control over the managers and the internal directors,
avoiding, or at least reducing, the corrupt activities
that could take place. Thus, we argue that boards
with a higher percentage of independent directors in
corruption-sensitive industries will have a stronger posi-
tive effect on the performance of the firm, compared to
non-corruption-sensitive industries. The market, in fact,
will recognize and appreciate the presence of this effi-
cient control mechanism, which could reduce agency
costs. Thus, coherently with the predictions of Hypoth-
esis 2, we refer to corruption as an agency cost. There-
fore, we posit that the positive effect of independent
directors on performance will be stronger in the context
of corruption-sensitive industries. This leads to the fol-
lowing hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5: The positive association between
independent directors and returns is stronger in
corruption-sensitive industries.
Methodology
Our research includes three levels of analysis. For each
level, different data have been collected and employed to
test the set of hypotheses raised in the previous section.
In what follows, we report a detailed description of our
data sets and empirical strategies.
Data description
We use both corruption and financial data for the follow-
ing countries: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, United Kingdom and United States. The choice of
using these countries is motivated by two main factors.
First, over the period 2002–2012, they accounted for
approximately 70% of world market capitalization
(Word Economic Indicators – World Bank) and for 60%
of the World GDP (World Economic Outlook Databases
– International Monetary Fund). Second, since one of
the ultimate goals of the paper is to test whether standard
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agency theory holds in corruption-sensitive industries,
we selected countries that have been covered by that
literature.
Country-level data on corruption are obtained through
the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), which is
a research data set summarizing views on quality of
governance provided by a large number of enterprises,
citizens and expert survey respondents in advanced
and developing countries. These data are gathered
from a number of survey institutes, think tanks, non-
governmental organizations, international organizations,
and private industry firms. In particular, the indicator of
interest in this paper is the control of corruption, which
reflects perception of the extent to which public power is
exercised for private gain, including both petty and
grand forms of corruption, as well as capture of the state
by elites and private interests. The control of corruption
variable ranges from approximately –2.5 (weak control
meaning high corruption) to 2.5 (strong control meaning
low corruption). The countries’ average levels of corrup-
tion are reported in Table 1.
Firms are classified by industry according to
the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB), jointly
created by the FTSE and Dow Jones. The following
industries are considered: basic materials, consumer
goods, consumer services, financials, industrials,
healthcare, oil & gas, telecommunications, technology,
utilities.
Table 2 reports the number of firms included in each
country and in each industry. For each firm, the follow-
ing set of variables is used: Returns (Ret); Return
on Assets (ROA); Number of Board Meetings
(BoardMeeting); Percentage of Board Independent
Directors (Independent%): Market Capitalization
(MarketCap); Financial Debt (Debt); Change in Cash
(CashChange). Data have been retrieved from
Bloomberg. We stress that each variable is averaged over
the period 2002–2012. This implies that there is one
observation per firm (in each country and in each indus-
try). We report the main descriptive statistics in Table 3.
Empirical strategy
Our empirical scheme is composed by three distinct
analyses. First, at the country level, we re-examine the
relationship between corruption and stock market per-
formance. In the spirit of Prosperi (2013) and Donadelli
and Persha (2014), this is developed, via standard scatter
plots, in an industry-by-industry context. Our results
confirm the existence of a strong relationship between
corruption and financial performance across countries.
Second, via a standard OLS regression – where the
dependent variable is represented by returns and the
independent variable is the level of corruption – we
examine whether there is heterogeneity in the strength of
such a relationship among different industries. The
R-square is employed to classify the industries that
display a stronger relationship. In doing this, we are able
to classify industries as ‘corruption-sensitive’ (relatively
high R-square) or ‘non-corruption-sensitive’ (relatively
low R-square). Thus, ‘corruption-sensitive industries’
are those where the relationship between the level of
corruption within a country and the related industry
stock market performance is stronger. Descriptive statis-
tics for ‘corruption-sensitive industries’ are reported in
Table 4. The t-test suggests that, in general, there are
Table 1 Control of corruption in sample countries
Country Control of
Corruption
Australia 2.01
Canada 1.99
France 1.39
Germany 1.80
Italy 0.23
Japan 1.27
United Kingdom 1.78
United States 1.50
The strongest 2.01
The weakest 0.23
This table reports average control of corruption indicator over the period
2002–2012, which ranges from approximately −2.5 (weak) to 2.5
(strong). Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators.
Table 2 Total number of firms by industry and country
Country\Industry BasMats ConsG ConsS Financ HC Industr Oil&Gas Tech Telec Utilities Total by
country
Australia 828 86 114 308 108 199 150 66 21 25 1,905
Canada 292 37 78 426 38 98 146 41 6 19 1,181
France 28 123 133 394 63 174 19 139 7 20 1,100
Germany 41 95 91 284 47 152 26 114 10 17 877
Italy 5 47 34 67 8 59 9 23 3 17 272
Japan 270 513 614 456 152 994 15 394 15 33 3,456
United Kingdom 131 93 185 426 76 281 94 125 19 19 1,449
United States 107 152 200 727 84 301 206 92 12 77 1,958
Total by industry 1,702 1,146 1,449 3,088 576 2,258 665 994 93 227 12,198
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significant differences, between corruption-sensitive and
non-corruption-sensitive industries.
Third, in order to test our firm-level hypotheses, we
run an OLS regression where the dependent variable
is the 10-year average stock market return for each
company and the explanatory variables are the board
characteristics (i.e., size, percentage of independent
directors and number of board meetings). Since we are
interested in testing the impact of our corporate govern-
ance variables on companies operating in environments
displaying different corruption levels, we run the regres-
sion by focusing first on corruption-sensitive and sub-
sequently on non-corruption-sensitive industries. The
basic regression takes the following form:
Re
%
t ROA BoardMeeting BoardSize
Independent Ma
= + + +
+ +
α β β β
β β
1 2 3
4 5 rketCap
Debt CashChange+ + +β β ε6 7
(1)
where Ret is the average stock market return; ROA is
average return on assets; BoardMeeting is the average
number of meetings held by the board; BoardSize is the
average number of board members; Independent% is
the average percentage of independent directors on the
board. MarketCap is the average value of common
equity, Debt denotes average debt, and CashChange is
the average change in cash. Note that all quantities in
equation (1) are averaged over the period 2002–2012,
consistently with a similar cross-sectional approach that
can be found in Edison et al. (2002).
Empirical results
We start the analysis by looking at the unconditional
relationships among variables. Estimation results are
presented in Table 5. We can see that Returns are signifi-
cantly correlated with all of our three variables of interest
(Board meetings, Board size and Independent %). More
specifically, Board meetings and Board size are nega-
tively and significantly correlated with Returns, while
Independent % is positively correlated with Returns.
Overall, these first findings show that the selected board
characteristics do have an impact on Returns, and thus,
deserve more attention.
In order to test our Hypothesis 1, we rely on the
results shown in Figure 1. Figure 1 plots the average
returns (on the vertical axis) against the average level of
control of corruption (on the horizontal axis) in the
sample countries. Results are reported for ten different
industries (basic materials, consumer goods, consumer
services, financials, industrials, healthcare, oil & gas,
telecommunications, technology, utilities). Overall, we
observe a positive relationship, that is, industry average
returns increase as the level of corruption decreases
(moves towards 2.5) or, in other words, as the level
of the control of corruption increases. We stress that this
Table 4 Descriptive statistics (corruption sensitive industries)
Variable N Mean Standard
Deviation
t-test
Returns 6,196 0.043 0.235 6.09***
Return on Assets (ROA) 4,498 0.529 147.32 −4.11***
Board meetings 1,833 11.10 5.08 2.78***
Board size 1,953 9.00 3.203 0.779
Independent % 1,905 0.492 0.325 −8.03***
Market Capitalization 4,412 2,508 11,779 −2.21**
Debt 4,592 3,723 37,732 −5.77***
Cash Change 4,505 60.618 657.65 −5.10***
This table reports descriptive statistics for the subsample of observations
included in corruption sensitive industries. It futher reports the result
of a t-test performed in order to compare the characteristics of the
subsample of observations operating in corruption sensitive industries
against the rest of the sample.
Levels of significance are indicated by: *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05,
***p < 0.01.
Table 3 Descriptive statistics (whole sample)
Variable N Mean Standard
Deviation
1st
Quartile
Median 3rd
Quartile
Returns 12,198 0.057 0.257 −0.024 0.044 0.134
Return on Assets (ROA) 10,300 −4.131 101.18 −3.651 1.568 4.634
Board meetings 4,210 11.247 4.99 7.33 10.5 14.333
Board size 4,455 9.047 3.149 7 8.667 10.75
Independent % 4,348 0.445 0.344 0.038 0.520 0.777
Market Capitalization 10,153 2,238.77 10,743.00 34.25 138.84 808.80
Debt 10,447 2,111.80 25,295.74 1.98 30.70 273.20
Cash Change 10,322 35.09 447.82 −0.102 0.827 5.964
This table reports descriptive statistics for the variables used in our analyses. We report the mean, standard deviation and values of the interquartile
range for the following variables: Returns is the average 10-year return in the 2002–2012 period. ROA is the 10-year average return on assets. Board
meetings is the average number of meetings held by the board during the 2002–2012 period. Board size is the average number of board members during
the 2002–2012 period. Independent % is the average percentage of independent directors on the board during the 2002–2012 period. Market
Capitalization (multiplier: billions) is the average value of common equity during the 2002–2012 period. Debt (multiplier: billions) is the 10-year
average debt. Cash change is the change in cash, averaged over the 2002–2012 period.
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negative relationship between corruption and perfor-
mance is stronger in the following industries: consumer
services, financials, oil & gas and technology. Therefore,
the order of magnitude of the co-movement between
returns and corruption varies among industries. Of
course, this has strong asset allocation implications. By
focusing on emerging stocks, Donadelli and Persha
(2014) obtain a similar result. Specifically, they observe
that the negative relationship between stock market
excess return and control of corruption is stronger in the
following industries: basic materials, consumer goods,
financials, industrials.
Entries in Table 6 report the effect of the board char-
acteristics on returns and, of course, allow us to test for
hypotheses 2, 3, 4 and 5.
Model 1 shows that the three variables of interest are
significant. In particular, Board meetings and Board size
are negatively associated with returns, while Independ-
ent % is positively associated with the dependent vari-
able at the 10% significance level. Model 2 and model 3
are run respectively over a subsample of companies
operating in corruption-sensitive and non-corruption-
sensitive industries. The comparison of significance
levels and the coefficients’ magnitude allows us to
answer our research questions.
Board meetings are significant both in model 2 and
in model 3, and the magnitude of the coefficients is
roughly the same. This suggests that the association
between the number of meetings held by the board and
the ability of the company to produce positive cash
flows in the future (as measured by returns) is not dif-
ferent between the two subsamples. The number of
board meetings has been analysed by the literature and
associated with higher efficiency and control of the
board (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). Our results suggest
that the higher the number of board meetings, the
lower the market returns. Board size is significant at
the 1% level in all the three models, but while the coef-
ficient is –0.0095 in model 2, it is –0.0075 in model 3.
This suggests that the economic significance of Board
size is higher for companies operating in industries in
which the negative relationship between corruption and
financial performance is higher. Finally, the percentage
of independent directors is, in the overall sample, posi-
tively correlated with returns, as shown by the coeffi-
cient 0.0179. However, this result seems to be driven
mainly by those companies operating in corruption-
sensitive industries. In fact, model 2 shows that the
coefficient of the variable Independent % is positive
and significant at the 5% level, while model 3 shows
that the same variable is not significant.
Overall, these empirical findings confirm Hypothesis
2: companies operating in industries where the effect of
corruption on performance is higher will have to face
higher conflicts of interests between managers and
owners. In other words, corruption exacerbates agency
conflicts between managers and owners.
The negative association between Board size and
performance is stronger in corruption-sensitive indus-
tries. In line with previous works (see Yermack, 1996;
Eisenberg et al., 1998), this suggests that a larger board
is less effective in monitoring management, and that this
effect is stronger in companies operating in corruption-
sensitive industries, where the conflicts between manag-
ers and owners are stronger and need a more effective
board to keep them under control. Besides this effect,
this empirical result is also consistent with another argu-
ment proposed in framing Hypothesis 2: the higher the
number of board members, the higher the potential for
corruption. Board members have a central role in the
firm and potential chances for corruption are likely to
arise because of direct interactions between board
members and public officials.
Looking at the Independent % variable, we see that a
higher percentage of independent directors is associated
with better performance for companies operating in
corruption-sensitive industries, suggesting once again
that in those industries, the agency problem is more
severe. In fact, these companies benefit to a greater
extent from the corporate governance mechanism that is
meant to reduce the agency problem, coherently with
previous studies (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983).
Our results, overall, provide evidence confirming our
Hypothesis 2. Managers operating in high-corruption
Table 5 Correlation matrix
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Returns 1
Return on Assets (ROA) 0.038*** 1
Board meetings −0.071*** −0.007 1
Board size −0.120*** 0.0716*** −0.110*** 1
Independent % 0.064*** 0.019 −0.576*** 0.078*** 1
Market Capitalization 0.010 0.019** −0.069*** 0.328*** 0.187*** 1
Debt −0.015 0.004 0.020 0.198*** 0.052*** 0.362*** 1
Cash Change −0.007 0.005 −0.000 0.167*** 0.054*** 0.373*** 0.709*** 1
This table displays the Pearson pairwise correlations among our main variables of interest for our sample of observations.
Levels of significance are indicated by: *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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environments may have incentives to obtain business
opportunities providing short-term benefits. However
this may jeopardize the company’s ability to create value
in the future. Anecdotal evidence shows several cases of
companies that have been convicted for corruption, with
a negative impact on their reputation and on their ability
to work with other public entities in the long term.
Beyond the cases mentioned previously, there are many
Figure 1 Control of corruption vs. industry stock returns
Notes: This figure plots countries’ ‘average control of corruption’ (on the horizontal axis) against ‘industry average stock return’ (on the vertical axis).
Industry average returns are computed from stock price indices. Corruption data are from the Worldwide Governance Indicators. Data are annual and
run from 2002–2012.
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other significant cases (see SEC, 2014). Additionally,
they may corrupt public officials, using resources of the
firm, in order to gain personal benefits.
These results make significant contributions to aca-
demic literature, and in particular to the vast stream
of literature relying on the agency theory. The theory
(see Berle and Means, 1932) has been absolutely
central for many academic studies in the field of man-
agement and accounting. Over the years, the agency
theory has been refined and adapted to different con-
texts. In firms characterized by concentrated owner-
ship, in particular family firms, which provide typical
evidence in Continental Europe, the agency conflict is
not between managers and owners (as in classic agency
theory), but rather between majority and minority
shareholders (see Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; La Porta
et al., 1999).
In our article, we show that agency problems are more
severe in corruption-sensitive industries. We employ a
new construct (the level of corruption) in order to further
investigate how the agency theory applies to different
contexts. We focus on the level of corruption existing in
some countries/industries, looking at the impact of this
phenomenon on agency theory problems. This repre-
sents an important step towards the adaptation of the
agency theory to different contexts in modern globalized
society.
Finally, we analyse the single board characteristics
and their effects on returns. Hypothesis 3 is confirmed,
because the economic significance of the coefficient of
Board size is higher in model 2 compared to model 3.
Therefore, higher board sizes are associated with a lower
stock market performance, in line with previous studies
(see Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993; Yermack,
1996). Additionally, we observe that the effect is more
pronounced for companies operating in corruption-
sensitive industries. This result is consistent with prior
literature, and the difference in the magnitude of the
coefficients suggests that there is a further effect on
companies operating in corruption-sensitive industries.
The effect may be due to the fact that a higher number
of directors increases the probability of companies to be
in contact with public officials, which increases the
possibility of bribes and corruption activities. Or it
may simply be due to the fact that the board is less
effective.
Our empirical results do not allow us to draw any
definitive evidence for Hypothesis 4, because Board
meeting is associated negatively with returns both in
model 2 and model 3, also indicating that its effect does
not significantly vary between corruption-sensitive and
non-corruption-sensitive industries. The result seems
counter-intuitive, as Board meeting is negatively associ-
ated with returns also in the context of low correlation
between performance and corruption. Further analysis is
necessary in order to examine the issue more.
Finally, Hypothesis 5 is confirmed, because the
percentage of independent directors is significant and
positive in the subsample of companies operating in
corruption-sensitive industries. This shows that, coher-
ently with Hypothesis 2, the companies benefiting from
such corporate governance mechanisms to a greater
extent are the companies with the greatest need to be
protected from corruption. Our results are aligned with
previous literature stating that independent directors are
believed to be more talented in monitoring managers and
CEOs (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Weisbach, 1988).
The analysis provides important insight both for aca-
demics and practitioners. As agency theory needs to be
contextualized and analysed in different contexts, simi-
larly it is important to define the effect of different
corporate governance mechanisms on performance.
Therefore, companies operating in corruption-sensitive
industries may consider this result in order to shape their
corporate governance system in the most effective way.
Similarly, investors may take the corporate governance
characteristics of firms operating in corruption-sensitive
Table 6 Effect of board characteristics on Returns
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Full sample Corruption
sensitive
industries
Non corruption
sensitive
industries
Return on
Assets (ROA)
−0.0006 0.0021*** −0.0011
(0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0009)
Board meetings −0.0026*** −0.0022** −.0022*
(0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0012)
Board size −0.0088*** −0.0095*** −0.0075***
(0.0011) (0.00162) (0.0016)
Independent % 0.0179* 0.0337** 0.0230
(0.0109) (0.0138) (0.0165)
Market
Capitalization
0.0001 0.0001 −0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Debt −0.001*** −0.001** −0.001**
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Cash Change 0.0001 −0.0001 0.00001
(0.0001) (0.0001) 0.00001
Intercept 0.2139*** 0.181*** 0.2104***
(0.0192) (0.023) (0.0301)
Number of
observations
4,109 1,791 2,318
F-test 17.95*** 14.06*** 9.10***
R2 0.03 0.042 0.041
This table analyses the determinants of Returns. The dependent variable
is Returns, and the main variables of interest are Board meetings, Board
size and Independent %. Model (1) relies on the full sample. Model (2)
relies on a subsample of companies included in corruption sensitive
industries, defined as the four industries in our sample with the highest
R2 in the OLS regression with returns (dependent variable) and level of
corruption (independent variable). Model (3) refers to the subsample of
companies operating in non-corruption-sensitive industries. Standard
errors in parentheses.
Levels of significance are indicated by: *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05,
***p < 0.01.
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industries into account in order to make their investment
decisions. We emphasize that our study builds on and
extends the field of literature on corporate governance
mechanisms and their relation with performance.
Conclusions
This study examines the effects of corruption at the
country, industry and firm levels, providing new insight
for academics as well as practitioners. At the country
level, it shows that corruption has (on average) a
negative impact on stock returns. This builds on and
extends early empirical evidence (see Mauro, 1995;
Prosperi, 2013; Donadelli and Persha, 2014). At the
industry level, exploiting the magnitude of this macro
relationship, we classify firms operating in ‘corruption-
sensitive industries’ and ‘non-corruption-sensitive
industries’. This is a relevant methodological innova-
tion because, to the best of our knowledge, no previous
study has operated such a distinction before. This
empirical strategy allows us to focus on ten different
industries, rather than merely on the country, and to
test whether corruption exacerbates agency conflicts.
Empirical findings suggest that companies operating
in corruption-sensitive industries tend to face higher
agency costs. The result is linked to the first part of the
paper, providing some rationale to the negative impacts
of corruption. Agency theory has played a key role in
the academic debate, and will continue to play a key
role in the future. Over the years, the initial intuition
by Berle and Means (1932) has been developed further,
contextualizing and making the construct more refined
in different contexts. Our contribution allows the exten-
sion of agency theory predictions to contexts (more
specifically: industries) with different levels of corrup-
tion on performance.
At the firm level, building on the evidence that
corruption-sensitive industries have different charac-
teristics in terms of agency problems compared to
non-corruption-sensitive industries, we examine the
ability of three corporate governance mechanisms to
protect companies from agency costs in the context of
corruption-sensitive industries. Specifically, empirical
evidence suggests that the greater the size of the board,
the lower the performance, and that this effect tends to
be more pronounced in corruption-sensitive industries.
Similarly, the positive effect of independent directors
on performance is stronger in industries that are
corruption-sensitive.
This study provides a relevant contribution to current
literature. First, it introduces a methodological innova-
tion by classifying industries in corruption-sensitive and
non-corruption-sensitive. This allows one to go beyond
the standard country-level perspective and focus on the
industry level, which we believe will become increasing
relevant in the future, given the increasing globalization
of culture and markets. Second, it provides evidence that
may be useful to investors, which may take the charac-
teristics of corporate governance mechanisms into
account in making their investment decisions. Third, it
extends agency theory by contextualizing and studying
its prediction in different contexts (corruption-sensitive
industries).
The present work also has some limitations, which
may be addressed by future studies. First, our three-level
approach is new and helpful but, at the same time, it
offers three sections of information that are not fully
integrated. Future research could build on our insights
by introducing a truly multivariate analysis that com-
bines all three levels into one theoretical model and
estimates this multi-level model in one stage. In other
words, our work is an important first step towards the
creation of a truly multi-level analysis of corruption.
Second, we did not analyse companies operating in con-
texts of extreme corruption, such as some African and
Latin American countries. Such analysis goes beyond
the scope of our work, but may be the object of future
study, as it deals with even less analysed contexts. Third,
future studies may employ different performance meas-
ures (such as accounting measures of performance) in
order to tackle the research issue. Our work is one of the
first attempts to link macro (corruption) and micro (firm
performance and corporate governance) business dimen-
sions. Future research is needed in order to make sig-
nificant progress on this theme, and such an effort needs
to be accomplished by the whole field of study on cor-
porate governance.
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